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Introduction
There is a substantial empirical literature on wages in exporting …rms. This literature was initiated by who found evidence for productivity and wage premia in exporting …rms. Since then there has been a large number of studies replicating and extending their analysis, and by now it seems to be a stylized fact that exporting …rms are more productive and pay higher wages than non-exporting …rms (see Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2006) for a recent list of existing studies). 1 There are competing theories as to why this is the case, but most support has been found for self-selection of the most productive …rms into exporting as the explanation (see e.g. Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) ). Hence, the standard explanation is that the superior performance of exporting …rms is due to unobserved heterogeneity. In this paper, we consider whether the wage premium in exporting …rms is linked to the use of human capital in exporting …rms. A distinguishing feature of exporting …rms is that they use more highly educated labour than non-exporting …rms. This is what international trade theory would suggest for countries that are relatively well endowed with educated labour, and this is con…rmed by existing studies (see e.g. ). Therefore, one hypothesis is that the export premium in wages is actually an educated labour premium. In recent papers by Barth (2002) , Battu, Bel…eld and Sloane (2003) and Martins (2004) evidence for the existence of human capital externalities at the work place level is found, i.e., the wage level in …rms using more educated labour increase beyond the level explained by the individual educational attainment. Thus the exporting variable may pick up such spillover e¤ects of education, if they are not properly accounted for in the wage equation.
An alternative hypothesis we consider is that there is an export premium in wages, but this premium interacts with the education level in …rms. That is, the export wage premium is higher in …rms using more educated labour. The existence of a link between the skill level, international trade and wages has been suggested by Schott (2004) . He documents that …rms producing unskilled labour intensive goods are more likely to be in direct competition with …rms from low wage countries at international markets. Therefore, a higher skill intensity in exporting …rms may mitigate the e¤ect of competition from low income countries, and, if there is …rm speci…c wage bargaining, this lower level of competition may turn into higher wages (see e.g. Dowrick (1989) and Slaughter (2001) ).
This paper can be seen as combining the literature on the exporting wage premium with insights from the literature on human capital externalities. The evidence on the existence of human capital externalities are mixed. For example Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) …nd no impact of average skill levels on average wages in US states, while Moretti (2004) reports a signi…cant positive impact of the share of graduates in US cities on individual worker wages. In the present context we are interested in human capital spillovers at the …rm level, and these may be particularly important because it is likely that individuals interact more and learn more from each other at this level compared to the city or region level. We have access to a unique matched worker-…rm panel data set with information about …rms'export behaviour. Our empirical approach is to compare otherwise similar individuals working in …rms with di¤erent export intensities and shares of highly educated workers in the workforce. In contrast to most of the literature on exporting wage premia, our data set allows us to control for observed and unobserved individual characteristics, such as ability, that are correlated with wages and the export status of …rms. It is likely that high-quality workers sort into exporting …rms. For example exporting …rms may reward observed and unobserved ability better than non-exporting …rms, causing high-ability workers to select into exporting …rms. In this case, the observed exporting wage premium might simply be due to di¤erences in observed and unobserved worker characteristics.
Our empirical analysis starts out by reestablishing results from the two literatures on exporting wage premia and external returns to education. First, we con…rm the …nding by Bernard and Jensen and others that exporting …rms pay higher wages, although it is not whether the …rm exports but the export intensity that matters. This result is in line with the only other study that uses matched worker-…rm data (Schank el al. (2006) ). Second, we …nd that not only is there a positive e¤ect of individual education on individual wages, but there is also a considerable spillover e¤ect of education on other workers on top of this private return. That is, we …nd that a higher skill intensity in the …rm has a positive impact on wages of all workers in the …rm. Third, we …nd that …rms who export more also use more skilled labour, but this does not explain why there is a wage premium in exporting …rms. Finally, we show that the size of the export premium is increasing in the skill intensity of the …rm, as we …nd that the inclusion of an interaction term between the export intensity and the skill intensity enters the wage equation with a signi…cant positive e¤ect. In addition, this interaction term absorbs all of the direct e¤ect of the export intensity and part of the direct e¤ect of the the skill intensity of the …rm. In other words, we …nd that there is an export premium, but it is increasing with the …rm level skill intensity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we o¤er some theoretical considerations about the link between wages, education and international trade. In section 3, we describe the data set. In section 4 we specify the empirical model and present the estimation results. Finally, in section 5 we conclude.
Two alternative hypotheses
The point of departure of our paper is that wages are higher in exporting …rms than in non-exporting …rms. The standard hypothesis in the literature is that this is a result of the most productive …rms self-selecting into being exporters. This self-selection process may exist if there are …xed costs of exporting, because it is only the most productive …rms who …nd it pro…table to "invest"in exporting (see e.g. Clerides et al (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Melitz (2003)). A competing theory is that …rms become more productive when entering foreign markets because of competition and learning in international markets, see e.g. Clerides et al. (1998) . However, only a few empirical studies …nd that this is actually the case (see e.g. Girma, Greenaway and Kneller (2004) ).
Irrespective of whether the exporting wage premium is a result of self-selection or learning in export markets, the premium is not necessarily related to the …rms'use of human capital. But this possibility is our focus, and we will consider two separate hypotheses in relation to this issue.
Hypothesis 1
The …rst hypothesis we propose is that the export premium found in empirical studies re ‡ects a missing variable in the estimations, namely the human capital level in the …rms. Human capital intensive countries have a comparative advantage in human capital intensive production, and so exporting …rms -i.e., the …rms that exploit comparative advantages -employ more educated labour than non-exporting …rms.
2 Moreover, as suggested by the results found in Barth (2002) , Battu, Bel…eld and Sloane (2003) and Martins (2004) , there are human capital spill-overs inside companies. The idea is that workers interact at the workplace and learn from each other, and this interaction e¤ect is stronger the more high skilled workers there are. Notice that this human capital e¤ect is in addition to the private return to education. Hence, according to this hypothesis, the wage level is higher in exporting …rms than in non-exporting …rms, but this is a result of exporting …rms using more human capital than non-exporting …rms.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis acknowledges the existence of an export premium in wages -for example due to the self-selection of the most productive …rms into being exporters -but the size of the premium depends on the skill intensity in the …rm. The foreign markets a …rm is able to serve may depend on the type of labour employed in the …rm. A …rm producing clothes may for instance choose to produce a "standard" product. To do this it mostly needs unskilled labour and machines. Alternatively the …rm may produce expensive design clothes and by doing so the …rm may enter a market with product di¤erentiation and a lower degree of competition. To enter such markets, the …rm needs to employ highly skilled labour to develop and brand the product. As documented in Schott (2004) , low wage countries mainly produce low priced (low quality) goods. Hence, it seems likely that …rms that choose the …rst strategy and produce unskilled labour intensive "standard" goods are more likely to compete with …rms from low wage countries in export markets. In contrast, …rms who pick the second strategy and employ high skilled labour may escape intense competition from low wage countries. Lower product market competition, in turn, is likely to spill over into wages if the labour market is unionised and workers and …rms bargain over wages (see e.g. Dowrick (1989) ). Also there is solid empirical evidence showing that spill-overs from the product market to the labour market exist, see e.g. Blanch ‡ower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996), Hildretch and Oswald (1997), Slaughter (2001) and Arai (2003) . In addition, case studies of speci…c markets also o¤er support for the hypothesis that by using more skilled labour a …rm may better serve markets with less competition. One example is Goldberg (1995) who …nds that the demand elasticities for luxury and sports cars are lower than those for other types of cars. Another example is Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) who …nd that the demand elasticity for premium beer is lower than that for popular (standard) beer.
To sum up, our hypothesis is that if a …rm produces a "standard good", there is in-tensive competition in international markets from low wage countries. Fierce competition in turn puts downward presure on the pro…t margin of the …rm as well as on wages. By spending ressources on product di¤erentiation -i.e., employing more skilled labour to undertake e.g. innovation, design or branding -a …rm may be able to sell goods in international markets where the degree of competition is lower. That is, the …rm may sustain a higher pro…t margin, but workers also gain from a reduced competitive pressure through higher wages. Hence, our second hypothesis is that, if there is a positive export premium in wages, it should mainly be found in …rms employing high-skilled labour -i.e., there is a positive interaction e¤ect between exporting and the skill intensity in the …rm on wages.
Data
We have access to a very rich matched worker-…rm longitudinal dataset covering the total Danish population for the years 1999-2002 -the socalled FIDA dataset which is based on administrative registers. Each individual and each …rm is associated with a unique identi…er, and most importantly all employed individuals are linked with a …rm identi…er at the end of each year. Detailed information on individual socio economic characteristics is available on an annual basis. These individual level variables are extracted from the integrated database for labour market research (IDA) and the income registers in Statistics Denmark, which have been used in numerous studies. For more details on the IDA dataset see e.g. Abowd and Kramarz (1999) . To this matched worker …rm dataset we have merged detailed records on international trade for all …rms from The Danish External Trade Statistics. The external trade statistics are compiled in two systems; Intrastat (trade with EU countries) and Extrastat (trade with non-EU countries), and the compilation follows internationally agreed principles for statistics on international trade, see Statistics Denmark (2003) for further details. If a …rm exports a speci…c product to any given country in any given month, this is recorded as one observation in the data. That is, for each combination of …rm, month, destination country and product code 3 the total (fob) value of the transaction is known.
In addition to the trade variables there is information about total sales of the …rm, thus allowing us to calculate the export ratio of each …rm in each year. Furthermore we also construct a measure for the capital labour ratio of each …rm as the value of land, buildings, machines, equipment and inventory divided by the number of full-time workers, and (log of) the size of the …rm in terms of the workforce is also included in the analysis as a control variable. From the matched workers we also calculate the proportion of workers with further education at the …rm level.
We restrict attention to trade with countries outside the EU countries 4 and Norway for two reasons. First, data on intra-EU trade is censored in a way such that only …rms exporting goods with a total annual value exceeding a certain threshold 5 are recorded in the …les. No such data limitations exist for trade out of the EU. Second, Denmark is a small and very open economy in which a relatively large proportion of …rms export. The formation of the internal market in the EU during the 1990s has abolished most trade impediments, and so the EU can increasingly be regarded as the domestic market for Danish …rms, and due to the small size of the Danish market a relatively large part of all medium sized and large …rms almost by de…nition must be exporters. By focussing on trade with countries outside the EU we get more variation across …rms, and such trade better resemble that of …rms in larger economies like the US. Throughout the paper we only analyse …rms (and their workers) with more than 50 employees, and there are several reasons for this. First, the small …rms are much less inclined to export. Second, the link between workers and the small …rms is sometimes incorrect or missing. Finally, the number of workers with further education employed in a …rm is in practice indivisible, and, therefore, in small …rms our measure of skill-intensity becomes very sensitive to the hiring or …ring of a single educated worker. This implies that our measure of skill-intensity would be very noisy in small …rms. The resulting dataset still covers the majority of workers in the manufacturing sector; almost 3/4 of all workers are employed by …rms with more than 50 employees.
A number of studies have documented substantial heterogeneity among …rms within industries with respect to their export behaviour, see Tybout (2003) for an overview. Far from all …rms export, and this is also true even for Danish manufacturing …rms with more than 50 employees, cf. Table 1 . Around 85 percent export their products to countries outside EU15 and Norway (88 percent in 2002). There is clearly a positive correlation between …rm size and the propensity to export; if all …rms with more than 10 employees had been included only approximately 55 percent would be counted as exporters using the same export de…nition. Danish manufacturing …rms sell around 18 percent to countries outside EU15 and Norway. Had we included EU15 and Norway in the export de…nition more than half of manufacturing production is exported. This, of course, re ‡ects the fact that the EU countries are very important export destinations for Danish companies. For comparison report for US manufacturing …rms in 1987 that 15 percent export, while for French manufacturing …rms in 1986 Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) report that 17 percent export. 6 These are much lower numbers and indicates the inevitable negative correlation between domestic market size and export orientation. The percentages exported for these two countries are 10 percent and 22 percent respectively. This shows that by focussing on exports to countries outside EU and Norway the export behaviour of …rms is more comparable to that of …rms in larger economies.
Insert Table 1 here Table 2 displays sample means for nonexporters, exporters and exporters with an export intensity exceeding 10 percent. Danish exporters are indeed larger, older and use a higher share of workers with further education. Interestingly, …rms that export a relatively large proportion of their sales also have an even higher share of workers with further education. In the empirical analysis in the following section, we use this share of workers in the …rm having a further education as our measure of the skill intensity in the …rm.
With respect to average wages, exporting …rms in fact pay somewhat lower wages to workers with a vocational education, but they pay more to workers with further education. Thus the raw data suggests the existence of a link between exporting, wages and skill intensity.
Insert table 2 here
Among the individual level variables the hourly wage rate is obviously the most important one in the analysis, and this wage rate is calculated as total labor income divided by the total number of hours worked in any given year. A long list of individual socio economic characteristics are used as control variables in the analysis. There are self explanatory dummies for gender, the presence of children, the presence of two adults in the household, immigrant status and city size. We also include standard human capital variables, i.e., dummies for educational attainment, labour market experience, experience squared and job tenure. In addition, there are dummies for membership of unemployment insurance funds and trade unions. We also include dummies for the occupation and industry of the individual. Occupational dummies are based on the Danish version of the ISCO-88 de…nition, and we operate with the nine main categories. The industry dummies are based on the three digit NACE level, which leaves us with 36 manufacturing industries.
We restrict the sample to include only full-time manufacturing workers in the age group of 18-65 years. In the …nal data set used for wage regressions there are 302,309 persons yielding 958,884 person-years. Descriptive statistics for selected individual level variables are displayed in Table 3 .
Insert table 3 here

Empirical Analysis
In this section we consider whether exporters are paying higher wages when worker characteristics are taken account of? If so may this e¤ect be explained by a lack of control for the skill intensity of the …rm (our …rst alternative hypothesis)? And is it robust to the inclusion of an interaction term between export and skill intensity (our second alternative hypothesis)?
Skills, exports and individual wages
The empirical strategy is to compare wages of otherwise similar workers who work in …rms with di¤erent skill intensities and export behaviour. Suppose that the hourly wage rate of worker i in …rm j at time t is determined by a simple Mincer human capital wage equation of the form log
Individual covariates such as experience, experience squared and tenure are included in x it ; and …rm speci…c variables -notably variables for whether …rms are exporting and the share of workers in the …rm having further education (the skill intensity) -are contained in z jt : This model is an individual …xed e¤ects speci…cation, i.e., i is a time-invariant unobservable component of human capital such as intelligence or motivation. Thus, in contrast to the vast literature on exporting and wages that rely on …rm level data alone, we are able to control for the fact that workers in exporting …rms may have better observed and unobserved characteristics than workers in nonexporting …rms. One important source of bias in the coe¢ cients of interest ( ) may be unobserved …rm characteristics that are correlated with export variables or the skill intensity and individual wages. To alleviate this problem one strategy would be to include …xed e¤ects for pairs of workers and …rms. However, such a strategy is not straightforward in the present case because we only have four years of data. If we included worker-…rm …xed e¤ects, identi…cation would only be based on stayers and thus come from changes in export and skill intensity in a …rm over time. Over only four years such variation is minimalthere is in particular very little within-…rm variation in the skill intensity -so we need to rely also on movers to identify the e¤ects of skill intensity. 7 Instead we are careful to control for as much observed …rm heterogeneity as possible. In the regressions below we include information on capital per worker, …rm size measured by the number of employees, the share of women, the share of union members, the share of part time workers and the share of the workforce with age above 40 years. In section 2 we outlined di¤erent hypotheses concerning the export premium in wages, and Table 4 displays estimation results related to these hypotheses. The three models in the table are the results of running di¤erent speci…cations of the wage equation in (1), and in all cases we include year dummies, industry dummies and individual covariates as reported in table 3 (coe¢ cients not reported).
Insert table 4 here
In the …rst model we do not control for the skill intensity in the …rm, and we do not allow for any interactions between skill intensity and exporting. This model, therefore, corresponds to the traditional approach in the literature on wage premia in exporting …rms. However, in contrast to this literature we control for observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity. We …nd that the decision to export or not has no impact on wages, while the export intensity has a signi…cant positive impact on wages. The coe¢ cient implies that a ten percentage point increase in the export intensity corresponds to 3.3 percent higher wages. This result is very similar to the …ndings by Schank et al. (2006) who study a German matched worker-…rm dataset. They also …nd no impact of the export dummy but a positive impact of the export intensity, and in their corresponding speci…cation wages rise by 2.8 percent for blue collar workers and 1.5 percent for white collar workers when the export intensity rises by ten percentage points.
In the second model, we include the share of the workers in the …rm with further education as our measure of the …rm level skill intensity. First, we see that the skill intensity variable has a substantial and highly signi…cant impact on wages (a ten percentage points higher skill intensity corresponds to 11 percent higher wages). Second, we see that inclusion of the skill intensity variable only slightly reduces the coe¢ cient to the export intensity variable. Thus, although exporting companies do have a much higher share of further educated workers, and a higher share of further educated workers leads to higher wages, the wage premium in exporting …rms is not a result of a higher skill intensity in exporting …rms. That is, we can reject the …rst alternative hypothesis.
In the third model, we include the interaction term between skill intensity and export intensity. Firms may hire more high skilled workers to di¤erentiate their products to escape competition in world markets, and this bene…t from the skill intensity is more pronounced the more involved the …rms are in export markets. Thus the inclusion of the interaction term allows us to better distinguish between the competing explanations behind the export and human capital premia. If …rms learn from exporting and this is the reason behind the positive exporting wage premium, this e¤ect should stand irrespective of the inclusion of the interaction term. Likewise if there are important social returns to education, the direct e¤ect of skill intensity should be una¤ected by the interaction term. We …nd that the interaction term indeed enters the wage equation with a large and positive e¤ect. Furthermore this e¤ect absorbs the entire e¤ect of the export intensity while the skill intensity still has a direct positive impact on wages, but its magnitude has been reduced somewhat. Thus, we …nd clear evidence in support of our second hypothesis.
An interesting extension is to allow for heterogeneity in the e¤ects across educational subgroups of the workers. In the following we have split the sample in three groups; unskilled workers, workers with vocational education and workers with further education, and Table 5 shows the results.
Insert table 5 here
Qualitatively there is not much di¤erence between the subgroups, but the e¤ects seem to be strongest for workers with vocational education. In model 1 these workers is the only group to experience a signi…cantly positive e¤ect of export intensity. They also have the highest coe¢ cient to the skill intensity in model 2, but unskilled workers and workers with further education also gain from having co-workers with further education. In model 3 the interaction term has a signi…cant positive impact for all three subgroups (only at the 10 percent level for workers with further education), and again the e¤ect is strongest for workers with vocational education. Interestingly the direct e¤ect of skill intensity is no longer signi…cant for any subgroup and the coe¢ cients are all smaller than for the full sample. This questions the robustness of the notion of human capital spill-overs at the …rm level. Further, workers with vocational education even have a weak negative direct e¤ect of export intensity, so perhaps the direct e¤ect of exporting may actually for some workers signal more competition and thus lower wages. To sum up, we …nd that the evidence we found for our second hypothesis for the full sample is not qualitatively sensitive to heterogeneity across educational subgroups.
Endogeneity
An important question is wether we can attach any causal interpretation to the relationship between exports, skill intensity and wages. Exporting may increase wages if …rms learn and become more competitive by serving foreign markets, but as argued in the introduction support has been found for reverse causality in the sense that productive high paying …rms self-select into exporting. Another source of endogeneity bias is if …rms face increasing demand for their products in export markets and as a result pays higher wages through rent sharing. At the same time the higher demand likely leads to a higher export intensity. In this case exporting is not causing higher wages. Likewise, with respect to the relationship between skill intensity and wages, increased demand may induce …rms to hire younger and more educated workers which would imply a higher skill intensity, but it would be wrong to interpret this as a causal relationship from skill intensity to wages.
In this sub-section we address this issue by instrumenting the export and skill intensities and the interaction term between the two variables. Of course, implementation of instrumental variables methods calls for acceptable instruments in the sense that they are relevant, i.e., they explain a signi…cant amount of variation in the endogenous regressors, and they are valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term in the wage equation. As instruments for the export intensity we use the age of the …rm, the export ratio of the …rm's industry 8 and the 10 year lagged export ratio. We argue that the age of the …rm potentially a¤ects the export intensity as …rms grow over time and increasingly enter export markets. At the same time we do not expect age to play a direct role in wage determination. The average export ratio of the industry is likely to be correlated with the …rms export intensity but it appears not to be signi…cantly related with wages in the Danish labour market, see Munch and Skaksen (2005) . As instruments for the skill intensity we try with the average skill intensity of the industry and the average skill intensity of the local labour market. 9 Skill intensities at more aggregated levels should be exogenous to and correlated with the …rm level skill intensity and it is not immediately clear that they should be important for wage determination given that we also include industry …xed e¤ects and regional control variables. For the interaction term we use as instruments the six combinations of interacted instruments. In a situation with multiple potential instruments for each potentially endogenous variable we may test for relevance and validity of the instruments. Our strategy is as a …rst step to include all instruments implementing two-stage least squares, since this may generate more e¢ cient estimates. 10 Next we evaluate the relevance of instruments in two ways. First, we implement the test of redundancy suggested by Hall and Peixe (2003) for each instrument 11 , but we never found any signs of redundancy of any of our instruments in any model below. Second, for the …nal set of instruments we calculate the clusterrobust F -test for excluded instruments corresponding to the "partial R-squared" measure of instrument relevance proposed by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995). The F -statistic rejects the null that the instruments are jointly equal to zero in all …rst-stage regressions although sometimes only at the 10 percent level in the regression for the export intensity. Finally, with respect to the validity requirement we …rst test each instrument individually using the C-statistic by choosing a conservative signi…cance level of 20 percent. For the skill intensity in the local labour market we rejected the null hypothesis that this instrument is valid, so we dropped it along with its interaction terms. For all the remaining valid instruments we also evaluate their overall validity using the cluster-robust version of Sargan's statistic for over-identi…cation (the Hansen J-statistic) and it was never rejected. Table 6 presents the estimation results for the full sample corresponding to the previous results of Table 4 . In model 1 the coe¢ cient to the export intensity almost triples, but it is no longer signi…cant. In model 2 the skill intensity is added and its coe¢ cient is slightly higher than the corresponding OLS coe¢ cient. Again it is no longer signi…cant, but it is well known that 2SLS standard errors have a tendency to be large. In model 3 we add the interaction term and the coe¢ cient to this variable more than doubles and it is signi…cant at the 10 percent level. Interestingly in this case the interaction term absorbs both direct e¤ects, such that there no longer seems to be any spillover e¤ect of education at the …rm level. We also calculate and report the cluster-robust version of the Hausman test of endogeneity of the potentially endogenous variables in the models, and in no case can we reject the null that the variables under consideration are exogenous. Thus, overall the IV results do not indicate endogeneity, and, if anything, they only reinforce the OLS results.
Insert table 6 here
Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the relationship between a …rm's education level, export performance and wages of its workers. We have o¤ered a brief discussion of the possible theoretical connection. We argue that …rms may escape intense competition in international markets by using high skilled workers to undertake or improve innovation, design or branding and thereby di¤erentiate their products. Lower product market competition, in turn, is likely to spill over into wages if the labour market is unionised and workers and …rms bargain over rents created in the …rm. That is, we should …nd a positive association between a …rm's share of educated labour and wages of the workers.
Using a very rich matched worker …rm longitudinal dataset we …rst reestablish two separate results from the existing literature. First, controlling for observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity, we …nd that …rms with high export intensities pay higher wages. The existing literature uses …rm level data and is therefore unable to control for worker heterogeneity. We show that even after controlling for possible selection of high quality workers into exporting …rms the exporting wage premium still stands. Second, in line with a small literature on …rm-level human capital externalities, we …nd that the …rm level skill intensity increases wages of all workers in the …rm. This indicates that interaction with high skilled workers at the workplace may lead to learning and higher productivity and wages for all.
Our main result is that inclusion of an interaction term between the export intensity and the proportion of educated workers at the …rm level enters the wage equation with a signi…cant positive e¤ect. In addition, this interaction term absorbs the direct e¤ect of exporting and much of the e¤ect of …rm level education. These results are consistent with the …ndings of Schott (2004) in the sense that …rms may increase their use of highly educated labour to di¤erentiate their products and thereby escape intense competition at international markets. By doing so wages may increase as workers are in a better bargaining position if there is less intensive competition at the goods market. That is, in line with our theoretical considerations, the export wage premium accrues disproportionately to workers in …rms with high skill intensities.
A Appendix: Tables and …gures Only manufacturing …rms with more than 50 employees are included. Table 3 ), individual …xed e¤ects, industry e¤ects, year e¤ects and …rm level variables (capital per worker, log of …rm size, the share of women, the share of union members, the share of part time workers and the share of the workforce with age above 40 years) are included in all models. Table 3 ), individual …xed e¤ects, industry e¤ects, year e¤ects and …rm level variables (capital per worker, log of …rm size, the share of women, the share of union members, the share of part time workers and the share of the workforce with age above 40 years) are included in all models. Table 3 ), individual …xed e¤ects, industry e¤ects, year e¤ects and …rm level variables (capital per worker, log of …rm size, the share of women, the share of union members, the share of part time workers and the share of the workforce with age above 40 years) are included in all models.
